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THE ECONOMY of the United States is primarily based upon the
principle of free competition. It is the objective of the anti-
trust laws' to maintain this free competition. Activities within the
business community which tend to create a monopoly or to lessen
competition are likely to be attacked by an appropriate govern-
mental agency or by a private suit for damages.
There is, however, one important area of business activity
in which monopoly and freedom from competition is sanctioned
by the government; specifically, the area of patents. In order to
encourage ingenuity and "to promote the progress of the useful
arts,"2 the founding fathers gave to Congress the power to establish
a patent system, and, specifically, to grant to inventors the exclu-
sive right to their discoveries for a limited period of time. In return
for the limited monopoly, the general public is given a full dis-
closure of the invention. The nation also benefits from the advance
in technology resulting from the inventor's skill and ingenuity.
While recognizing the historic position of patents and the
constitutional basis for the patent grant, the courts in the last
fifty years, due to the upsurge of sentiment towards the enforce-
ment of antitrust laws, have taken a closer look at the activities of
* B.S.E.E. 1958, Illinois Institute of Technology; J.D. 1965, Chicago-Kent College of
Law; Electrical Engineer for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and Electrical Engineer for
Snow Ice Permafrost Research Establishment (1959-1961).
1 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1965); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44
(1965); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1965).
2 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8. "[T]he Congress shall have the Power . . .To Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their Writings and Discoveries."
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the patent owner. No longer is a patent owner free to exploit his
patent as he sees fit. The patent grant allows the patentee to
"exclude others from making, using or selling' ' the patented item
or process. It does not, however, allow him to use his patent as
an excuse for engaging in a number of otherwise illegal activities.
Such activities are more commonly referred to as patent-antitrust
matters. Patent-antitrust matters stem from the impact of the
antitrust laws upon the patent owner's exploitation of his patent
rights, such rights in their inception falling squarely within the
patent law. A common exploitation of the patent occurs when a
patent owner who has a valid combination patent5 seeks to extend
his legal monopoly to an unpatented element of the combination,
via a suit for contributory infringement.
The doctrine of contributory infringement provides that a pat-
ent owner may sue a person who sells an unpatented component of a
patented combination with the intent and purpose of bringing
about its use in the patented combination." In many instances the
unpatented element involved is the heart of the patented combina-
tion and has as such no other substantial noninfringing use. To
illustrate, let us assume that a person has a patent on the combina-
tion AB, neither component A nor component B of the combina-
tion being patented. Component A is manufactured and sold by
another person to the public, who in turn combine component
A with B to produce the patented combination. Those who put
together the final combination are direct infringers of the patent;
nevertheless, due to the number of persons involved it is often
impractical, if not impossible, to bring actions against them. There-
fore, if the patentee were powerless to sue for contributory infringe-
3 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
4 As an example of such illegal activities, a patent owner cannot use his patent to
control the sale of unpatented materials. Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Motion Picture Patents
Co., 243 U.S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct. 416 (1917); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development
Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 51 Sup. Ct. 334 (1931); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458,
58 Sup. Ct. 288 (1938); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 Sup. Ct.
402 (1942).
5 A combination patent covers the relation or connection of a group of elements in
a particular way; it does not cover the elements independent of their combination.
6 The plaintiff, in bringing an action for contributory infringement, seeks to enjoin
conduct which is not within his patent grant. It is by seeking to enjoin such conduct that
the patentee encounters the defense of the patent misuse doctrine. The patent misuse
doctrine essentially holds that the owner of a patent may not employ his lawful limited
monopoly to control the sale of goods not covered by the patent. See Morton Salt Co. v.
G. S. Suppiger Co., supra note 4; Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp.,
supra note 4; Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., supra note 4.
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ment, he would, in effect, be denied his rights under the Constitu-
tion.
Realizing this fact, the courts for almost a century upheld the
right of a patent owner to sue a supplier of an unpatented com-
ponent of the patented combination for contributory infringement.
In 1944, however, the Supreme Court dealt a crushing blow to
the doctrine in its highly controversial Mercoid decisions. 7 Suit
was brought by Mid-Continent Investment Company against
Mercoid Corporation for contributory infringement of a combina-
tion patent. Mid-Continent had licensed Minneapolis Honeywell
to make, use, and sell, and to sub-license others to make, use, and
sell the patented combination, the heart of which was an un-
patented combustion stoker switch. Neither party manufactured or
installed the patented heating system; however, Minneapolis
Honeywell licensed those who bought their switches to use the
system. Mercoid, in its answer, denied the charge of contributory
infringement and alleged that Mid-Continent should be barred
from relief because it was seeking to extend the grant of the
patent to unpatented devices. Mercoid asked not only for declara-
tory relief but also for an accounting and treble damages. Mercoid
was granted an injunction, but its prayer for damages was denied
by the district court." The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed9 the judgment of the district court disallowing damages
under the counterclaim. In all other respects it reversed, holding
that Mercoid was guilty of contributory infringement. 10
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas,
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, stating:
It is the public interest which is dominant in the patent
system .... It is the protection of the public system of free enter-
prise which alike nullifies a patent where any part of it is invalid
7 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 Sup. Ct. 268
(1944); and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 64
Sup. Ct. 278 (1944).
8 43 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1942).
9 133 F.2d 803 (7th Cir. 1942).
10 The court's decision was based upon Leeds and Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking
Machine Co., 213 U.S. 325, 29 Sup. Ct. 503 (1909), in which the court granted an injunction
to the patentee of a combination phonograph and recording disc against a seller of
competitive recording discs even though these discs were capable of substantial non-
infringing use with phonographs made by defendant. This case was overruled in Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., supra note 7, when it came before the Supreme
Court.
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and denies to the patentee after issuance the power to use it in such
a way as to acquire a monopoly which is not plainly within the
terms of the grant."
The Court continued:
The result of this decision, together with those which have
preceded it, is to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory
infringement. What residuum may be left we need not stop to con-
sider... [C]ourts of equity will withhold relief where the patentee
and those claiming under him are using the patent privilege con-
trary to the public interest. 12
In Mercoid v. Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co.,13 Mer-
coid was held to be entitled to treble damages for the patentee's viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. The Court said: "[A] patent on a com-
bination is a patent on the assembled or funtioning whole, not on
the separate parts. The legality of any attempt to bring unpatented
goods within the protection of the patent is measured by the anti-
trust laws, not the patent laws."' 4
These decisions virtually abolished the doctrine of contri-
butory infringement, and were sharply criticized by the Attorney
General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, which stated:
We reject the view that any violation of patent law necessarily
violates antitrust laws .... To say that action beyond the borders
of the patent grant is a per se antitrust violation is to ignore the
Supreme Court's distinctions between the variant statutory stan-
dards of the Sherman, Federal Trade Commission, and Clayton
Acts as well as to repudiate the body of interpretations distinguish-
ing between offenses unreasonable per se and those not.15
The decisions in the Mercoid cases led to widespread con-
fusion and criticism. In essence, the criticism asserted that the
cases did away with contributory infringement; that they failed to
draw a distinction between patent misuse and antitrust violations;
and that it left the patentee at the mercy of one who deliberately
attempted to induce infringement of the patent by selling com-
ponents specially designed and adapted for that purpose.
Such criticism led to the passage of section 271 of the 1952
11 Supra note 7, at 655, 64 Sup. Ct. at 271.
12 Id. at 669, 64 Sup. Ct. at 273.
'3 320 U.S. 680, 64 Sup. Ct. 278 (1944).
14 Id. at 684, 64 Sup. Ct. at 280.
15 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study Antitrust Laws,
p. 254 (1955).
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Patent Code,' 6 which clearly re-established the tort of contributory
infringement. The Attorney General's Committee approved the
provision of section 271, stating:
At least they are reasonable expressions of congressional inten-
tion (a) to codify specifically the remedy of contributory infringe-
ment and affirmatively to declare that within the ambit of the
comparatively narrow doctrine so defined the action itself is not a
misuse; and (b) to cut down the breadth of all inclusive applica-
tions of the patent misuse doctrine stemming from the implica-
tions of the Mercoid and other cases. 17
The first case to be decided by the Supreme Court after
passage of section 271 was Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Re-
placement Co." In that case, Convertible Top Replacement was
the owner of territorial rights in a combination patent for a con-
vertible folding top. Action was initiated by them for contributory
infringement of the patent and for an accounting of profits against
the Aro Manufacturing Company, who manufactured and sold
replacement fabrics designed to fit automobiles equipped with the
plaintiff's tops. General Motors and Ford both manufactured cars
with the patented convertible top. However, Ford had no license
to use the tops during the years 1952-1955. The Aro Company was
charged with contributory infringement for replacing fabrics for
these convertible tops when they became worn. The District Court
held " that the patent was valid, and that it was infringed by the
car owner and contributorily infringed by Aro. The court enjoined
16 35 U.S.C. § 271. Infringement of a Patent.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses
or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, con-
stituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following;
(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would
constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another
to perform acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement
or contributory infringement (July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 811).
17 Supra note 15, at 253.
18 365 U.S. 336, 81 Sup. Ct. 599 (1961).
19 119 U.S.P.Q, 122 (1958).
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Aro from further manufacture, sale, or use of the replacement
fabrics. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed.2
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Whittaker,
reversed the decision of the appellate court and stated that under
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) the manufacture and sale of the replacement
fabrics for automobile convertible tops was not a direct infringe-
ment of a combination patent for convertible tops in that the fabric
was merely an element in the top, not claimed by the patentee as
part of his invention. The Court also held that there can be no
contributory infringement of a patent, under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c),
unless there is a direct infringement of the patent under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a). The Court stated:
The fact that an unpatented part of a combination patent may
distinguish the invention, it does not draw to it the privileges of a
patent. That may be done only in the manner provided by law.
However worthy it may be, however essential to the patent, an un-
patented part of a combination patent is no more entitled to
monopolistic protection than any other unpatented device. (Emph.
added).21
The Court concluded that mere replacement of individual
unpatented parts, one at a time, whether of the same part re-
peatedly or of different parts successively, is no more than the
exercise of a lawful right of the owner to repair his property, and
is not considered reconstruction.
From an analysis of the Court's opinion in the Aro case, it
would seem that where the element of the combination sold or
produced is one which reasonably can be expected to wear out or
to be consumed before the combination as a whole or a substantial
portion thereof, wears out or is consumed, the Court is likely
to interpret the acts of the alleged contributory infringer as "non-
infringing repair" rather than "infringing reconstruction."
The Aro case subsequently was to come before the Supreme
Court once again in 1964; however, in the interim there were a
number of cases decided by lower federal courts.
One of these cases was Angel Research v. Photo-Engravers
20 270 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1959).
21 Supra note 18, at 345, 81 Sup. Ct. at 604.
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Research.22 In that case, Angel brought suit for a declaratory judg-
ment with respect to the validity and infringement of Photo's
process patent. Photo had licensed certain manufacturers to
produce an unpatented additive of the process patent and to sell
it exclusively to members of Photo's organization. Photo asserted
in a counterclaim that Angel, by selling the additive, with in-
structions for its use in the etching process, to individuals who
were not members of Photo's organization, contributorily infringed
the patent. The District Court, in denying the counterclaim, stated:
It is well settled that if there is no direct infringement of a
patent there can be no contributory infringement. The burden of
proving a direct infringement by showing that the purchaser
actually practiced the invention claimed is upon the one asserting
infringement. The court may not speculate as to what these cus-
tomers did with Angel's additive.
23
In this case, the court emphasized the fact that before one
may be branded a contributory infringer, the one alleging such
infringement must prove that the alleged infringer's acts led to
a direct infringement of the patent.
In 1963, the case of Buxton v. Julen24 was before the Federal
District Court of New York. In that case, Buxton brought an action
for contributory infringement of a combination patent relating
to "flap enclosures and their fasteners." Julen denied any acts of
contributory infringement and alleged that the patent was invalid.
The district court held that the patent was valid and that Buxton
failed to establish that Julen had been guilty of contributory
infringement. The court's decision was based on its finding that
Julen did not know that the "channel bar" which it manufactured
was being used by its customer in a particular billfold, which
use infringed Buxton's patent. The court stated:
Section 271(c) requires that the defendant know that his com-
ponent is to be used by his customer in a particular article, which
article, whether the defendant knows it or not, in fact infringes
plaintiff's patent.
25
22 223 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
23 Id. at 676. The court further held that Photo's licensing agreement was a patent
misuse, and that the restriction therein constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade and
violated the antitrust laws. The patent was held unenforceable by reason of Photo's
misuse of the patent. The court awarded treble damages to Angel.
24 223 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
25 Id. at 701.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
In Fromberg Inc. v. Thornh il 26 and Fromberg, Inc. v. Gross
Mfg. Co.,' r the patent in suit covered a combination of two un-
patented elements, namely, a rubber plug and a metal tube which
could be used to repair holes in tubeless tires without removing the
tire from the rim. In both cases, the defendants manufactured
rubber plugs of a size and shape suitable for insertion into a
metal tube.
In Fromberg Inc. v. Thornhill,2 the Court of Appeals for the
5th Circuit found that the defendant was guilty of inducing
infringement under section 271 (b) by selling the plugs to service
stations. The court further found that the service stations were
guilty of a direct infringement when they used the defendant's
plug with the plaintiff's tube. The finding of direct infringement
was based upon the fact that the new plug inserted into the empty
tube produced the identical combination covered by the patent.2
Regarding the charge of contributory infringement, the court
went on to say that it was of critical importance to determine
whether the defendant had sold the plugs with the intent and pur-
pose that they be used to infringe, and whether the device was a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
non-infringing use. The case was remanded to determine this issue.
The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Fromberg Inc.
v. Gross Mfg. CoY0 disagreed with the conclusion reached by the
Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit that the reloading of the tubes
constituted direct infringement." The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
believed that an identical combination was also produced in the
Aro case and that the Aro case should be followed. The court
found that there was no direct infringement by the user of the
reloaded tube, in this instance relying on the repair-reconstruction
distinction set out in the Aro case. The court stated: "We hold
that the maintenance of the use of the whole of the patented
26 315 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1963).
27 328 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1964).
28 Supra note 26.
29 In so finding, the court relied upon the case of Cotton Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106
U.S. (16 Otto) 89, 1 Sup. Ct. 52 (1892). That case held that the making of completely new
ties out of discarded scrap material of the original patented ties amounted to the making
of the patented device (ties) and therefore constituted an infringement due to the
reconstruction of the ties.
80 Supra note 27.
31 The court also disagreed with the adherence by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals
to the Cotton Tie case. See note 29, supra.
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combination through replacement of a spent unpatented element
does not constitute reconstruction.' '82
The decisions of the two appellate courts in the Fromberg
cases indicate that there is no clear-cut answer as to what constitutes
repair or reconstruction within the ambit of the Aro case. For
this reason, the presence of direct infringement and thus, perhaps,
contributory infringement under section 271(c) will be difficult
to determine.
In 1964, the Aro case"3 once again reached the United States
Supreme Court.8 4 In the first case, the lower courts had found
Aro guilty of contributory infringement and enjoined it from
further infringements, but on certiorari the Supreme Court re-
versed the judgment. On remand of the case the District Court
read the Supreme Court's opinion as requiring dismissal of the
complaint against Aro regarding its sale of fabric tops to owners
of both Ford and General Motors automobiles, and judgment was
entered accordingly. Convertible Top appealed from the judgment
in so far as it applied to Ford cars, which were not licensed to use
the combination tops. Convertible Top argued that the Supreme
Court's reversal applied only to replacements of General Motors
cars, and not to Fords. The Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit held"5 that the Supreme Court's decision in the Aro case had
reversed the part of the judgment finding infringement as to
General Motors cars, which were made under licenses, but that
the Court had in effect affirmed the judgment as to Ford fabrics.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brennan,
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, stating:
[We] treated Convertible Top Replacement's right to relief
as depending wholly upon the question whether replacement of the
fabric portions of the convertible tops constituted "infringing re-
construction" or "permissible repair" of this patented combina-
tion .... [When the structure is unlicensed, as was true of the
Ford cars, the traditional rule is that even repair constitutes in-
fringement.36
The second Aro case has several unusual aspects. The major-
82 Supra note 27, at 808.
33 Previously discussed at footnote 18 and following.
34 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 84 Sup. Ct. 1526
(1964).
35 Convertible Top Replacement Co. v. Aro Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 52 (list Cir. 1964).
86 Supra note 34, at 479, 84 Sup. Ct. at 1528.
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ity of the Court (Justices Brennan, Harlan, Stewart, Goldberg
and White) found that there was contributory infringement by
Aro as to the Ford cars. However, there was disagreement, even
among the majority, as to the meaning of "knowledge" under
section 271(c).
Justices Brennan, Harlan, Stewart and Goldberg felt that the
knowledge Congress meant to require was simply the knowledge
that the component was especially designed for use in a patented
combination, and that it was not a staple article suitable for sub-
stantial noninfringing use. This construction follows the case law
prior to the Mercoid decisions3 7 and is in line with the Buxton
case. 8 Justices Warren, Black, Clark and Douglas, the dissenters
in result, interpreted section 271(c) as requiring proof that the
alleged contributory infringer know that the combination for
which his component was especially designed was both patented
and infringing. They found that Aro lacked knowledge under
this definition. Justice White agreed with the latter interpretation
of 271 (c), but found that Aro, in fact, had the requisite knowledge;
he thus concurred in the finding of contributory infringement.
In addition, Justices Warren, Black, Clark, and Douglas, all
of whom had been in the majority in the first Aro case, 9 disputed
the present majority's analysis of that case. They believed that
when the Court said "reversed" in the first case, it meant reversed
in toto and not in part, i.e., to Ford cars as well as General Motors.
They also believed that the effect of the Court's holding in the
first Aro case was that, since the fabric top was not itself patented,
Convertible Top could not extend its monopoly privileges regard-
ing the combination as a whole to the unpatented fabric cover.
Mr. Justice Black, in the course of his opinion, stated:
When articles are not patentable and therefore in the public
domain, as these fabric covers were, to grant them a legally pro-
3T7 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 Sup. Ct. 268
(1944); and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 64 Sup.
Ct. 278 (1944).
Prior to the Mercoid decisions, liability was established by a showing that the
component was suitable for no substantial use other than in the patented combination,
since it was the duty of the defendant to see to it that such combinations which it was
intentionally inducing and promoting should be confined to those which might be
lawfully organized. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 Fed. 712, 720-23
(6th Cir. 1897); 3 Walker, Patents 1764-65 (Deller ed. 1937).
38 Buxton v. Julen, 223 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
39 The opinion, however, was written by Mr. Justice Whittaker.
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tected monopoly offends the constitutional plan of a competitive
economy free from patent monopolies except where they are patent-
able "Discoveries."40
Justice Black further pointed out that the Court in defining con-
tributory infringement expanded the coverage of section 271(a),
which deals with direct infringement by making anyone who
innocently buys or repairs an unmarked article which infringes a
patent liable for damages as a direct infringer.
It is difficult from the decisions in the Aro cases to determine
with any degree of accuracy where the tort of contributory infringe-
ment lies. It can be stated, however, that the doctrine of contribu-
tory infringement was given new life by the 1952 Patent Code,
section 271, and that the mere bringing of a suit for contributory
infringement does not, in itself, constitute a patent misuse under
that section.
Since the renaissance of contributory infringement, no case
has squarely presented to the Supreme Court the issue of patent
misuse and probable antitrust violation, as did the Mercoid cases.
Only the issue of repair or reconstruction has appeared. However,
if the Supreme Court were now faced with a case involving the
factual situation presented in the Mercoid cases, it seems very
likely, in the light of section 271, that a different result would be
reached. Firstly, in Mercoid, the stoker switch was the heart of
the combination and was not a staple article, nor was it suitable
for any noninfringing use. And, under the numerical majority's
definition, knowledge would also exist since Mercoid knew that
the patented combination for which the stoker switch was
especially designed was both patented and infringing. Secondly,
in view of section 271(d), the activities of the plaintiff Mid-
Continent would not have supported a finding of patent misuse
or of an antitrust violation.
As we have seen, section 271 reinstated the doctrine of con-
tributory infringement as a remedy at law. However, since the
enactment of section 271 the courts have limited the section in
two ways:
(1) Where the courts are faced with the issue of repair or
40 377 U.S. 476, 522, 84 Sup. Ct. 1526, 1551.
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reconstruction involving an element of a combination which can be
expected to wear out or be consumed before a substantial part of
the combination wears out or is consumed, they will probably
interpret the alleged acts to be "noninfringing repair" rather
than "infringing reconstruction," thereby avoiding any possible
confrontation with section 271.
(2) The Supreme Court in construing "knowledge" under
section 271(c) has limited the applicability of the section by
requiring the alleged infringer to know that the combination for
which his component was especially designed was both patented
and infringing.
Therefore, although section 271 has given life to the doctrine
of contributory infringement, the courts in their interpretation of
section 271 have imposed, and most likely will continue to impose,
limitations upon it.
